Current Research Projects (last updated: October 2008)

With my dissertation completed, I believe I have achieved a very satisfactory understanding of issues concerning the interpretation of Bell-type theorems and Bell-type phenomena within quantum mechanics. In the future, I am intending to pursue my research both in the philosophy of physics and in the philosophy of science. I foresee at least three directions for my future research.

• PROBABILISTIC CAUSATION IN QUANTUM FIELD THEORIES

  In my dissertation, I got seriously involved with the literature on probabilistic causation during my research for my dissertation. Ascriptions of causal relations are commonly considered crucial elements of our understanding of the physical world. Most of the time, however, we are confined to ascribing only probabilistic relations between causes and their effects. The issue of probabilistic causation has been an important topic in philosophy of science at least since SuppesÕ seminal work, and the recent literature features important contributions in the field. In particular, manipulability theories of probabilistic causation, as developed by Pearl, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, as well as by Woodward, seem promising. These theories are typically designed so that to provide empirical criteria for distinguishing between genuine and spurious causes. Unfortunately, these theories still face some difficulties.

  It is dubious that a focus on probabilistic conditions alone is sufficient to distinguish genuine from spurious causes. There are counterexamples that demonstrate that to date, there are no necessary and sufficient probabilistic conditions to characterize genuine causes. These examples show that some constraints have to be added to the probabilistic characterization of causes in addition to the probabilistic conditions.

  Adding some specific spacetime constraints to theories of probabilistic causation is, I believe, promising for solving at least some of the difficulties that these theories face. It seems quite natural to require that causes and effects be connected in spacetime. In general, however, probabilistic relations do no indicate how events are to be embedded within a spacetime structure. Arguably, a complete account of probabilistic causation would include a discussion of how probabilities can be embedded in spacetime.

  I believe that one of the best theories in which to conduct the above research project is quantum field theory. The reason for this is threefold. First, quantum field theories are provided with a well defined spacetime structure, and hence would allow for the investigation of how to situate probabilistic causation in spacetime. Second, it is well known that quantum theories are probabilistic theories, and thus are appropriate for an investigation of probabilistic causation. Finally, considering quantum field theories offer a much wider range of phenomena that considering everyday events alone does. Bell-type correlations are of course a case in point. That said, quantum field theories feature some other phenomena for which the underlying causal picture remains unclear. Such phenomena have been recently exhibited in the literature by Jeremy Butterfield in his "Reconsidering Relativistic Causality" (2007). According to Butterfield, the Drummond-Hathrell and the Scharnhorst effects are awaiting for philosophical attention. I look forward to answer to ButterfieldÕs invitation and study the problem of causation in the context of these phenomena.

• SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

  In my dissertation, I give a defense of a version of the semantic view. I argue that the semantic view is both tenable and fruitful when seen as a methodological prescription to use model theory as a formal tool for the systematic study of the structure of theories and the structural relationships between theories. Seen as such, the semantic view is not meant to give a complete view of scientific theories. I lay out the three components of a complete view of scientific theories. A complete view of scientific theories must contain (1) an account of the structure of scientific theories, (2) an account of how this structure make scientific theories fit their typical function (among which is the function of representation), and (3) an account of how these structural and functional features allow scientific theories to fit scientistsÕ typical means and goals. While the version of the semantic view I advocate is an adequate tool to give a structural account (1) of scientific theories, it is not the case for a functional account (2) or for a pragmatic account (3) of scientific theories.

  That said, a consequence of my analysis is that the function and the pragmatics of scientific theories will crucially depend on the structural features of these theories. So, the version of the semantic view I advocate should be an important component of a complete view of scientific theories. In the future, I am looking forward to pursuing my investigation of the kinds of tools that are appropriate for the various components of a complete account of scientific theories. In particular, I am interested in assessing the possible achievements and necessary limits of formal methods for both the question of representation and scientific modeling.

• SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING

  In my dissertation, my work on scientific understanding has been essentially negative: I argue that existent notions of understandability of a theory are incomplete and are poor criteria for theory choice. In the future, I would like to contribute more positively to the growing literature on scientific understanding by linking it to my research on scientific models.

  Dennis Dieks and Henk de Regt give a pragmatic account of scientific understanding roughly in the following terms: someone understands a scientific theory if and only if they can predict how a system in a given theoretical context is going to evolve, without any need for explicit computation. This characterization captures some aspects of how scientists understand theories, but ignores the modeling practices that are crucial for the actual use of scientific theories. In particular, it is widely recognized that theories do not come equipped with rules that determine which models of the theory will adequately represent phenomena.

  I believe that one can improve Dieks and de Regt's characterization by linking it with the use of models in scientific practice. It is uncontroversial that an important part of scientific practice consists in using scientific models to represent the domain of the theory considered. Arguably, part of the understanding of a theory implicates the ability of scientists to choose the appropriate models. If true, then one might be able to improve on Dieks and de Regt's characterization of scientific understanding in the following way: someone understands a scientific theory if and only if they can decide which type of model is appropriate to apply to a system in a given theoretical context, without any need for explicit computation. I believe the above project is promising both for the investigation of the role of models in scientific practice and the notion of scientific understanding.